

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 05160 01 OF 03 271721Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /026 W  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3205

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 5160

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR EG US  
SUBJ: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SADAT

REF: CAIRO 5157

SUMMARY: IN LONG TALK WITH SADAT AND VP MUBARAK TODAY,  
I WENT THROUGH TALKING POINTS AS SUPPLEMENTED BY SECRETARY'S  
ORAL INSTRUCTIONS. SADAT LISTENED ATTENTIVELY  
AND SAID HE IS LOOKING FORWARD TO UPCOMING TALKS WITH  
PRESIDENT CARTER. HE EMPHASIZED HE IS ENCOURAGED BY  
NEW ADMINISTRATION'S ACTIONS AND EMPHASIZED HIS INTENTION  
DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MAKE TALKS A SUCCESS. IN  
RESPONSE MY URGING THAT HE COME UP WITH SOME CONCRETE  
IDEAS ON HANDLING KEY ISSUES, SADAT STATED HE WILL BE  
LOOKING FOR "SOME WAY TO GIVE PRESIDENT CARTER THE  
CARDS TO BE ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD ON ME PEACE EFFORT."  
HE HAD ALREADY MADE CLEAR TO ASAD HIS INTENTION TO DO  
SO AND HAD TOLD ASAD THAT WHATEVER HE IS ABLE TO DO  
SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED AS "CONCESSIONS"  
AS ASAD HAD EARLIER CHARGED IN CONNECTION WITH SINAI II. ON  
TERRITORIES AND A PALESTINIAN STATE, HOWEVER, THERE  
COULD BE NO "CONCESSIONS". SADAT INDICATED AWARENESS

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OF STILL UNRESOLVED PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION  
ISSUE AND NOTED HE HAD JUST CONCLUDED TALK WITH ARAFAT  
AND ABU IYYAD, WHICH HE HOPES WILL ENABLE HIM COME UP WITH SOME  
SPECIFIC FORMULAE TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE.  
HE AVOIDED BEING DRAWN OUT, SAYING HE STILL HAD TO PONDER  
WHAT KIND OF FORMULAE MIGHT BE DIVISED. SADAT CONTINUED  
TO OPPOSE A SINGLE ARAB DELEGATION, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE

PLO, CONTENDING ASAD'S SOLE PURPOSE IS TO VETO EGYPTIAN MANEUVERABILITY. HE WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR TO ASAD HIS OBJECTIONS TO THE SINGLE DELEGATION CONCEPT AND CLAIMED HUSSEIN ALSO OPPOSES IT. ON ARMS, I TOLD HIM THAT NEW ADMINISTRATION IS SENSITIVE TO HIS PROBLEM, BUT ALSO BELIEVES CAUTION NECESSARY. IT WOULD NOT HELP EITHER HIM OR PRESIDENT CARTER IF CONGRESS TURNED DOWN ARMS SALE REQUEST. THERE IS SOME THINKING IN WASHINGTON NEVERTHELESS THAT PERHAPS ADDITIONAL C-130'S AND PASSIVE EQUIPMENT MIGHT BE PROVIDED IF SADAT DEEMS THIS HELPFUL. SADAT ASKED ABOUT F5E'S I TOLD HIM THIS AIRCRAFT COMES UNDER HEADING OF LETHAL EQUIPMENT AND WOULD DOUBTLESS CAUSE PROBLEM. SADAT SAID HE UNDERSTANDS SITUATION, BUT WILL WANT TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH PRESIDENT CARTER. ON UNSC DEBATE, HE SAID THIS SHOULD BE HANDLED WITH FAHMY. FINALLY, HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR OUR CONTINUING EFFORTS TO MAKE CLEAR TO ISRAELIS OUR OBJECTIONS TO THEIR SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. END SUMMARY.

1. MET FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF TODAY WITH PRESIDENT SADAT AT THE BARRAGES. VP HUSNI MUBARAK WAS ALSO PRESENT. WHEN I ARRIVED AT THE BARRAGES, ARAFAT AND SALAH KHALAF (ABU IYYAD) WERE MEETING WITH SADAT AND MUBARAK, BUT PRESIDENTIAL AIDE SENSIBLY TOOK ME TO ANOTHER ROOM TO ENSURE THAT WE NOT MEET. SUBSTANCE OF MY TALK WITH SADAT FOLLOWS:

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2. UPCOMING VISIT: AFTER WELCOMING ME BACK AND SAYING I HAD BEEN AWAY A LONG TIME, SADAT INDICATED HE IS LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS SECOND WASHINGTON TRIP AND THAT FAHMY HAD BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL ON OUR TALK OF YESTERDAY (REFTEL) I TOLD HIM THAT PRESIDENT CARTER IS ALSO LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SADAT. AS HE KNEW, PRESIDENT CARTER WELCOMES THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO SADAT IN ADVANCE OF THE OTHER ARAB LEADERS IN ORDER TO EXPLORE IDEAS AND TO SEEK SADAT'S VIEWS AND COUNSEL ON HOW WE MIGHT BEST PROCEED. THE ROAD TO PEACE IS NOT AN EASY ONE, BUT PRESIDENT CARTER IS DETERMINED TO DO HIS UTMOST TO MAKE PROGRESS. IN ORDER TO DO SO, HOWEVER, HE NEEDS THE CONSTRUCTIVE HELP OF OUR ARAB AND ISRAELI FRIENDS. SADAT INDICATED HE IS MINDFUL OF THE HONOR OF BEING THE FIRST ARAB LEADER TO BE INVITED BY PRESIDENT CARTER AND EMPHASIZED HIS INTENTION TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MAKE THE TALKS A SUCCESS.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED.

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EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

3. KEY ISSUES: I THEN TOLD SADAT THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WILL WANT TO EXPLORE WITH HIM IN DETAIL THE THREE KEY ISSUES: (A) WITHDRAWAL AND BOUNDARIES, (B) NATURE OF THE PEACE TO BE ESTABLISHED IN A SETTLEMENT AND (C) QUESTION OF A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. PRESIDENT CARTER WILL WANT TO ELABORATE ON THE IDEAS HE DISCUSSED PUBLICLY ON MARCH 9 AND MARCH 16 ABOUT FINAL BOUNDARIES, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS TO ACCOMPANY WITHDRAWAL, NORMALIZATION MEASURES IN THE CONTEXT OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT AND A HOMELAND FOR THE PALESTINIANS. I NOTED SECRETARY VANCE HAD REPORTED FULLY TO PRESIDENT CARTER ON HIS TALKS WITH SADAT AND THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WILL WELCOME ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS PRESIDENT SADAT MAY HAVE DEVELOPED ON HOW TO TACKLE THESE ISSUES. I EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EGYPTIAN SIDE COMING UP WITH SOME CONCRET IDEAS.

4. SADAT LISTENED ATTENTIVELY AND SAID HE WILL BE LOOKING FOR "SOME WAY TO GIVE PRESIDENT CARTER THE NECESSARY CARDS TO BE ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE ME PEACE EFFORT." SADAT RECALLED HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO ASAD THAT HE INTENDS TO DO JUST THAT. HE HAD REMINDED ASAD OF THE LATTER'S EALIER ATTACKS ON HIM FOR GRANTING SO CALLED  
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"CONCESSIONS" AS PART OF SINAI II, E.G., TRANSIT OF ISRAELI CARGOES THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL, BUT HAD EMPHASIZED TO ASAD THAT WHATEVER HE, SADAT, MIGHT DO SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF "CONCESSIONS". THE IMPERATIVES OF A ME PEACE DICTATE THE RECOGNITION OF THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION. IN MAKING THIS POINT TO ASAD, HE HAD STRESSED THAT THERE ARE TWO ISSUES ON WHICH THERE CAN BE NO "CONCESSION", (A) TERRITORY AND (B) A PALESTINIAN STATE. SADAT THEN RECALLED THE "SECRET" DECISION TAKEN AT THE RABAT SUMMIT, IN WHICH ARAFAT HAD ACQUIESCED, THAT THE BORDERS OF A PALESTINIAN STATE SHOULD BE THE 1967 BORDERS. SADAT DID NOT INDICATE ASAD'S RESPONSE.

5. THE PRESIDENT

ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE IS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE UPCOMING VISIT. ALL SIGNS POINT TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S INTENTION TO GIVE PRIORITY TO THE ME ISSUE AND TO HANDLE IT IN A FAIR WAY. THE CANCELLATION OF THE CONCUSSION BOMB SALE TO ISRAEL, THE EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE GULF OF SUEZ OIL DRILLING PROBLEM, THE PUBLICLY STATED US POSITION ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS POLICY ARE ALL GOOD SIGNS AND HAVE ENCOURAGED HIM. HE WILL BE PREPARED TO TALK TO PRESIDENT CARTER ABOUT IDEAS ON SOLVING THE VARIOUS KEY ISSUES.

6. PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION: I COMMENTED THAT WASHINGTON WOULD BE PLEASED TO HEAR THIS, BUT NOTED THAT THE MOST IMMEDIATE ISSUE IN TERMS OF RECONVENING GENEVA THIS YEAR IS THE STILL UNRESOLVED MATTER OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION. I HAD FOUND CONSIDERABLE CONCERN IN WASHINGTON THAT THERE APPEARS TO BE NO PROGRESS TOWARD A SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM. THE RESULTS OF THE PNC MEETING HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTING IN THIS RESPECT. WE HAVE APPRECIATED THE FACT THAT SADAT IS LOOKING FOR WAYS TO OVERCOME THE OBSTACLES CREATED

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BY THE PALESTINIANS POSITION TO THEIR REPRESENTATION AT GENEVA AND WE AGREE THIS IS A MATTER FOR THE ARABS TO DEAL WITH IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. PRESIDENT CARTER, I EMPHASIZED, WILL WANT TO HEAR IN DETAIL SADAT'S LATEST THINKING ON THIS MATTER WHICH, IF NOT RESOLVED SOON, COULD BLOCK THE WHOLE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. I NOTED THAT THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS MAY FACE THE QUESTION WHETHER THEY ARE PREPARED TO LET THE PLO FRUSTRATE THE TALKS. PRESIDENT CARTER VERY MUCH HOPES THAT OUT OF HIS UPCOMING TALKS WITH SADAT WILL COME SOME CLEAR IDEA OF THE DIRECTION IN WHICH SADAT AND THE OTHER

ARAB LEADERS WILL WORK TO FIND A SOLUTION. IN THIS CONNECTION, I NOTED THAT SECRETARY VANCE HAD FOUND DIVERGENT VIEWS AMONG THE ARAB LEADERS ON THE MATTER OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT SADAT WOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONCERT WITH ASAD PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE IN ORDER TO PRESENT A COMMON ARAB VIEW. THIS IS ESSENTIAL IF PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE.

7. SADAT RECALLED HE HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT WITH ASAD PRIOR TO THE AFRO-ARAB CONFERENCE. HE HAD AGREED THAT IN THEORY THIS CONCEPT OF A SINGLE ARAB DELEGATION IS GOOD IN TERMS OF HAVING TO DEAL WITH THE ISRAELIS. HOWEVER, AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH ASAD, SADAT HAD EMPHASIZED THAT HE DOES NOT CONSIDER A SINGLE DELEGATION (TO INCLUDE THE PLO) AS FEASIBLE. SADAT HAD STRESSED TO ASAD THE DIFFICULTY CREATED BY THE DIVISIONS AMONG THE PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES. ACCORDING TO SADAT, ASAD HAD ULTIMATELY AGREED THAT A SINGLE ARAB DELEGATION WAS NOT POSSIBLE. SADAT UNDERSTOOD, HOWEVER, THAT DESPITE HIS AGREEMENT, ASAD HAD CONTINUED TO URGE THE IDEA OF SINGLE ARAB DELEGATION WHEN TALKING TO SECRETARY VANCE. SOMETIME LATER SADAT REITERATED THAT HE CANNOT ACCEPT THIS AND CLAIMED THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD ALSO EXPRESSED HIS OBJECTION TO THE CONCEPT. HUSSEIN HAD ARGUED FOR A SEPARATE PLO DELEGATION SINCE, AS HUSSEIN PUT IT, THE PALESTINIANS ARE

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"TOTALLY UNPREDICTABLE".

8. SHOWING HIS RESIDUAL SUSPICIONS OF ASAD, SADAT OBSERVED THAT ASAD'S PURPOSE IS TO PUT A "VETO" ON GOE FLEXIBILITY. IF THERE IS A SINGLE DELEGATION, SADAT NOTED, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE HEADED BY AN EGYPTIAN SINCE EGYPT ACCOUNTS FOR ONE THIRD OF THE TOTAL ARAB POPULATION. ASAD AND OTHERS WILL ASSUREDLY USE THE SINGLE DELEGATION CONCEPT TO LIMIT EGYPT'S MANEUVERABILITY. THIS, SADAT STATED, IS UNACCEPTABLE AND HE WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR TO ASAD HIS OBJECTIONS TO A SINGLE ARAB DELEGATION.

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EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

9. NOTING THAT ARAFAT AND ABU IYYAD HAD JUST BEEN IN  
TO SEE HIM, SADAT STATED HE HAD JUST DISCUSSED WITH THE TWO  
FATAH LEADERS THE MATTER OF THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION  
AT GENEVA. ON THE BASIS OF  
THIS LATEST TALK, HE HOPES TO BE  
ABLE TO PREPARE SOME FORMULAE WHICH MIGHT ASSIST IN  
RESOLVING THIS ADMITTEDLY DIFFICULT ISSUE. I SOUGHT TO  
DRAW HIM OUT, BUT SADAT SAID HE HAD TO  
PONDER HIS TALK WITH ARAFAT AND ABU IYYAD BEFORE  
FORMULATING SPECIFIC IDEAS. HE ASSURED ME THAT HE EXPECTS TO HAVE  
SOME SPECIFIC IDEAS TO DISCUSS WITH PRESIDENT CARTER.

10. ARMS. RECALLING HIS PERTINENT DISCUSSION WITH SECRETARY VANCE,  
I TOLD SADAT THAT I HAD FOUND GREAT  
SENSITIVITY IN THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TO THE EGYPTIAN  
MILITARY SUPPLY SITUATION. I HAD TO TELL HIM IN ALL  
CANDOR, HOWEVER,  
THAT I HAD ALSO FOUND A STRONG SENSE OF CAUTION RE THE  
SALE OF US EQUIPMENT. I RECALLED OUR PREVIOUS TALKS  
ON THE SUBJECT AND NOTED THAT CONCERN CONTINUES TO BE  
GREAT THAT, GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES,  
SURFACING THE ISSUE NOW COULD HARM THE GREATLY IMPROVED ATTITUDES  
TOWARD THE ME ISSUE THAT HAVE RESULTED IN LARGE DEGREE  
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FROM SADAT'S OWN STATESMANSHIP. I NOTED THAT THERE IS  
SOME THINKING IN WASHINGTON THAT  
PERHAPS SOME ADDITIONAL C-130'S AND  
PASSIVE EQUIPMENT MIGHT BE PROVIDED, IF SADAT BELIEVES  
THIS WOULD HELP HIS SITUATION. I STRESSED THAT IT WOULD NOT HELP  
EITHER HIM OR PRESIDENT CARTER IF AN ARMS SALE REQUEST  
WERE PUT TO THE CONGRESS AND TURNED DOWN. IN ANY EVENT,  
PRESIDENT CARTER LOOKS FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT  
WITH SADAT.

11. SADAT INDICATED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION. HE AGREED THAT ANY CONGRESSIONAL TURN DOWN OF AN ARMS SALE REQUEST FOR EGYPT WOULD HURT HIM AT HOME AND IN THE ME AREA. IT SHOULD NOT BE ATTEMPTED UNLESS WE ARE SURE IT WILL BE APPROVED.

12. HE DID NOT PICK UP MY C-130 COMMENT BUT ASKED ABOUT F5E'S. I TOLD HIM THAT THE F5E COMES UNDER THE HEADING OF LETHAL WEAPONS, WHICH WOULD DOUBTELSS GIVE US REAL PROBLEMS WITH THE CONGRESS. ALLUDING TO SADAT'S RECENT STATEMENT TO THE PRESS THAT THE F5E IS A "TENTH RATE AIRCRAFT," I SAID THAT WITH ALL DUE RESPECT I HAD TO DISAGREE WITH THAT DESCRIPTION. THE F5E IS A FIRST CLASS AIRCRAFT, WHICH BECAUSE OF ITS EXCELLENT MANEUVERABILITY HAS NOW BEEN INCORPORATED INTO THE USAF. IN CERTAIN SITUATIONS IT HAS BEE FOUND TO B A MATCH FOR THE PHANTOM. VP MUBARAK, WHO WAS A FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE, ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE F5E IS A FIRST CLASS AIRCRAFT. SADAT LAUGHED AND DID NOT PURSUE THE POINT OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT HE WILL WANT TO DISCUSS THE ARMS MATTER WITH PRESIDENT CARTER.

13. UNSC DEBATE: I THEN MENTIONED THE CURRENT UNSC DEBATE, EMPHASIZING OUR CONCERN THAT A DIVISIVE UNSC MEETING ON THE EVE OF SADAT'S VISIT WOULD HARDLY BE HELPFUL. SADAT AGREED, BUT SAID THIS WAS NOT A MATTER  
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THAT HE HAS BEEN DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH. I SHOULD DISCUSS IT WITH FAHMY.

14. ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS: I TOLD SADAT THAT THE USG REMAINS KEENLY AWARE OF THE PROBLEM POSED BY THE CONTINUED ESTABLISHMENT OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THAT WE HAVE AGAIN MADE CLEAR TO THE ISRALIS AT A HIGH LEVEL OUR OPPOSITION TO THIS ISRALI ACTIVITY. SADAT SAID HE WAS GLAD TO HEAR THIS, BUT NOTED THAT DESPITE OUR EFFORTS ISRAELI SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES SEEM TO GO ON. HE WISHED THAT WE COULD TAKE A STRONGER LINE WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THIS MATTER. I TOLD HIM THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE IN NO DOUBT ABOUT OR VIEW OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE THIS CLEAR TO THEM AS NECESSARY. SADAT INDICATED HIS SATISFACTION.

15. COMMENT: SADAT WAS CORDIAL AND RELAXED, BUT LOOKED TIRED. HE IS CLEARLY LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS UPCOMING MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER AND, IF HE RUNS TRUE TO

FORM, WILL DOUBTLESS COME UP WITH SOME IDEAS. THE  
EGYPTIANS MAY OVERESTIMATE THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE  
PALESTINIANS, BUT SADAT AT LEAST DESERVES CREDIT FOR  
TRYING TO INDUCE SOME PALESTINIAN FLEXIBILITY.  
THIS IS MORE THAN MOST OTHER ARAB LEADERS HAVE BEEN  
WILLING TO DO. ARMS SALES REMAIN ON HIS MINE, BUT I BELIEVE I HAVE  
CONDITIONED HIM TO THE LIKELIHOOD THAT OUR ABILITY  
TO HELP IN THIS SENSITIVE SPHERE WILL AT BEST BE LIMITED. AS I  
WAS LEAVING HE SAID HE WILL LET ME KNOW IF HE HAS ANY FURTHER  
THOUGHTS THAT HE WISHES CONVEYED TO WASHINGTON PRIOR TO HIS DE-  
PARTURE ON MARCH 31.  
EILTS

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED.

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## Message Attributes

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**TAGS:** PFOR, OVIP, EG, US, (SADAT, ANWAR), (CARTER, JIMMY)  
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**Type:** TE  
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